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Normative Data for 84 UK English
Rebus Puzzles
Emma Threadgold 1*†, John E. Marsh 1,2† and Linden J. Ball 1†
1 School of Psychology, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, United Kingdom, 2Department of Building, Energy and
Environmental Engineering, University of Gävle, Gävle, Sweden
Recent investigations have established the value of using rebus puzzles in studying the
insight and analytic processes that underpin problem solving. The current study sought
to validate a pool of 84 rebus puzzles in terms of their solution rates, solution times,
error rates, solution confidence, self-reported solution strategies, and solution phrase
familiarity. All of the puzzles relate to commonplace English sayings and phrases in the
United Kingdom. Eighty-four rebus puzzles were selected from a larger stimulus set of
168 such puzzles and were categorized into six types in relation to the similarity of their
structures. The 84 selected problems were thence divided into two sets of 42 items
(Set A and Set B), with rebus structure evenly balanced between each set. Participants
(N= 170; 85 for Set A and 85 for Set B) were given 30 s to solve each item, subsequently
indicating their confidence in their solution and self-reporting the process used to solve
the problem (analysis or insight), followed by the provision of ratings of the familiarity
of the solution phrases. The resulting normative data yield solution rates, error rates,
solution times, confidence ratings, self-reported strategies and familiarity ratings for 84
rebus puzzles, providing valuable information for the selection and matching of problems
in future research.
Keywords: problem solving, insight, rebus, norming, test validation
INTRODUCTION
Problem solving involves thinking activity that is directed toward the achievement of goals that are
not immediately attainable (e.g., Newell and Simon, 1972). It is a central aspect of human cognition
that arises across a range of contexts, from everyday activities to the attainment of major scientific
advancements and the achievement of important technological, cultural, and artistic developments.
Although problem solving can be fairly mundane (e.g., deciding what to make for your evening
meal) it can also lead to solutions that are highly creative (e.g., a delicious new dish prepared by
a master chef). This latter kind of “creative problem solving” is distinguished from other types of
problem solving in that it involves the generation of solutions that are both original and effective,
with the sole presence of either attribute being insufficient for a solution to be deemed creative (see
Runco, 2018). Not surprisingly, creative problem solving is held in especially high regard in all areas
of real-world practice.
Research on creative problem solving has burgeoned over the past 20 years, with a traditional
assumption being that people solve such problems in one of two different ways, that is, either (i)
through analytic processes, which involve conscious, explicit thinking that takes the solver closer to
a solution in a slow, step-by-step manner (e.g., Fleck and Weisberg, 2004; Ball and Stevens, 2009);
or (ii) through insight processes, which involve non-conscious, implicit thinking that gives rise
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to a sudden and clear realization of how to make progress toward
a solution (e.g., Sternberg andDavidson, 1995; Bowden and Jung-
Beeman, 1998, 2003a; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). According to
the latter view, such flashes of insight are typically characterized
as involving a major change in the representation of a problem,
arising from largely tacit processes of problem elaboration,
recoding or constraint relaxation (e.g., Ohlsson, 1992, 2011;
Knoblich et al., 1999; see also Bowden et al., 2005).
Notwithstanding the possibility that creative problem solving
can, in principle, occur in two distinct ways (i.e., either via
explicit, analytic processes or via implicit, insight processes)
the emerging consensus is that a good deal of the time people
probably deploy a mix of both conscious analysis and non-
conscious insight when tackling creative problems (e.g., Barr
et al., 2014; Sowden et al., 2014; Gilhooly et al., 2015; Weisberg,
2015, 2018; Barr, 2018). This move away from polarized views
of creative problem solving as involving either analytic processes
or insight processes marks an important change in recent
theorizing, which over the past couple of decades has tended
to become sidetracked by rather narrow and somewhat esoteric
debates focused on a very limited set of tasks and paradigms.
The welcome emergence of more nuanced and encompassing
theories of creative problem solving has arguably been fueled
not only through improved theory-driven experimentation
(including neuroscientific studies; for a recent review see Shen
et al., 2017), but also through the availability of a greater variety
of problem-solving tasks that can be used by researchers in
laboratory-based studies of problem-solving phenomena. This
means that nowadays researchers are not just reliant on so-
called “classic” insight tasks that often have their origins in
Gestalt studies of problem solving (e.g., Duncker, 1945, candle
problem or Maier, 1930, nine-dot problem), but that they can
also make use of many other problems that may be solved to
varying degrees by analysis or insight, such as remote associate
tasks (RATs) (e.g., Mednick, 1968), matchstick algebra problems
(e.g., Knoblich et al., 1999), magic tricks (e.g., Danek et al.,
2014a,b) and rebus puzzles (e.g., MacGregor and Cunningham,
2008; Salvi et al., 2015), which are the focus of the present
paper.
Classic insight problems suffer from a numbermethodological
issues that have arguably limited their value in advancing
an understanding of creative problem solving (for relevant
arguments see Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003a;MacGregor and
Cunningham, 2008). Most notably, there is a restricted pool of
such classic insight problems from which researchers can draw,
whichmeans that studies using these problems often involve only
a small number of items. In addition, classic insight problems
can be very difficult to solve, with very few participants achieving
a correct solution without some sort of hint being provided.
Moreover, problem-solving times can be lengthy, often taking
up to 10min per problem. Classic insight problems are also
heterogeneous and prone to being influenced by confounding
variables (e.g., the amount of time that is available for solution
generation itself is an important confounding factor that is
often overlooked in theorizing; but see Ball et al., 2015). These
problems may also yield ambiguous solutions that are difficult to
quantify.
As an alternative to classic insight problems, researchers have
turned in recent years toward the extensive use of compound
remote associates (CRA) problems, which are conceptual
descendants of the RAT first developed by Mednick (1968).
CRA problems involve presenting participants with three words
(e.g., pine, crab, sauce) for which they are required to produce
a solution word which, when combined with the three words,
generates three compound words or phrases (i.e., pineapple, crab
apple, apple sauce). CRA problems have significant advantages
over classic insight problems. Although variation of problem
difficulty exists within CRA sets (Bowden and Jung-Beeman,
2003a; Salvi et al., 2015) they are comparatively easy to solve,
fast to administer, more resistant to potentially confounding
variables and typically yield unambiguous solutions (Bowden and
Jung-Beeman, 2003a; MacGregor and Cunningham, 2008; but
see Howe and Garner, 2018). Importantly, too, it is possible to
construct a large number of CRA problems, as has recently been
demonstrated byOlteteanu et al. (2017), who used computational
methods to generate a repository of around 17 million American
English CRA items based on nouns alone and meeting tight
controls. Furthermore, CRA problems can be presented in
compressed visual areas, rendering the problems suitable for
electroencephalography (EEG; e.g., Bowden and Jung-Beeman,
2003a,b; Sandkühler and Bhattacharya, 2008) and functional
magnetic resonance (fMRI; e.g., Bowden and Jung-Beeman,
2003a,b) procedures. In addition, CRA problems allow for
control over stimulus presentation and response timing (e.g.,
Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003a) and lend themselves well to
priming paradigms in which primes (e.g., Howe et al., 2016)
solution hints (e.g., Smith et al., 2012) or solution recognitions
can be presented across or within hemispheres (e.g., Bowden and
Jung-Beeman, 2003b).
In the present paper we focus on rebus puzzles (e.g.,
MacGregor and Cunningham, 2008; Salvi et al., 2015), which are
starting to feature more commonly in problem-solving research
and have many of the benefits of CRAs, as well as some
additional advantages. Rebus puzzles involve a combination
of visual, spatial, verbal, or numerical cues from which one
must identify a common phrase or saying. As an example, the
rebus problem “BUSINES,” when correctly interpreted, yields the
common phrase “Unfinished Business.” Such rebus problems
have been used in research on creative problem solving-processes
such as studies of fixation and incubation phenomena (Smith
and Blankenship, 1989), with rebus problem-solving success also
having been shown to be positively correlated with performance
on remote associate problems, whilst being independent of
general verbal ability (MacGregor and Cunningham, 2008).
Rebus puzzles are relatively easy to present to participants and
have only single “correct” answers, which means that responses
are straightforward to score. Importantly, however, the problems
are moderately challenging to solve, although they are often
solvable with persistent effort. The difficulty of rebus puzzles may
arise, in part, from there being many ways in which they can
be tackled (cf. Salvi et al., 2015), but may also be a consequence
of the problem information initially misdirecting solution efforts
because the solver draws upon implicit assumptions derived
from the experience of normal reading (Friedlander and Fine,
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2018, similarly suggest that normal reading may engender
misdirection when solving cryptic crossword clues). Such self-
imposed constraints may lead solvers to reach a point of
impasse, where solution progress is not forthcoming, with such
impasse needing to be circumvented by problem restructuring
(see MacGregor and Cunningham, 2008; Cunningham et al.,
2009). The challenges for solving rebus puzzles that arise from
tacit, self-imposed assumptions can readily be seen in the rebus
example “CITY,” whose solution is “capital city.” The font of
the presented text is a superficial feature that would usually be
ignored in normal reading, despite potentially carrying figurative
meaning in the context of a rebus puzzle. Indeed, the difficulty
of a rebus problem is believed to be a function of the number
of implicit assumptions that need to be broken (MacGregor and
Cunningham, 2008, 2009).
Another factor that makes rebus problems useful in problem-
solving research is the observation that solvers often cannot
report the details of the preceding processing that led to
a solution, which is especially likely when such solutions
are accompanied by an “Aha!” experience that is suggestive
of an insight-based problem-solving process (MacGregor and
Cunningham, 2008). Notwithstanding the fact that rebus puzzles
can be solved via implicit, insight processes, there is also evidence
that they are open to solution via analysis as well or a varying
combination of both analysis and insight (MacGregor and
Cunningham, 2008, 2009).
In sum, rebus puzzles offer a means by which a large
pool of homogenous problems of different difficulty can be
administered within a single session in order to investigate
the processes of analysis and insight that underpin creative
problem solving. Such rebus puzzles are rapid to administer and
relatively under-represented in the problem-solving literature
in comparison to tasks such as CRA problems. Despite the
increasing use of rebus puzzles in problem-solving research,
there exists very limited normative data relating to such
problems in relation to their solution rates, solution times and
phenomenological characteristics, with current norming studies
being restricted (as far as we are aware) to the validation of
a set of Italian rebus puzzles (Salvi et al., 2015). The lack
of normative data is problematic given that rebus puzzles
are linguistically context dependent, relating, as they do, to
common words, sayings or phrases that exist in a particular
language, including idiomatic expressions that have become
culturally conventionalized. Language-specific normative data
are, therefore, vital for advancing the use of rebus puzzles in
problem-solving studies so that researchers can have confidence
that the problems that they select for their experiments have
desired characteristics to enable specific research questions to be
studied.
To address the absence of normative data for English rebus
puzzles, this paper presents normative data for 84 rebus items
that are underpinned by common United Kingdom (UK)
English phrases or sayings. The normative data that we obtained
provide details of typical solution rates, error rates, and correct
solution times (seconds) as well as standard deviations for all
solution times. In addition, we obtained ratings of participants’
confidence in their solutions, their familiarity with the solution
phrases as well as a self-report measure of the extent to
which participants felt that they had solved the problem via
a process of analysis vs. insight. The latter data were elicited
to align with the emerging theoretical consensus that it is
useful to view creative problem solving as involving a mix of
processes that fall along a continuum ranging from analysis to
insight.
We further note that an inspection of rebus puzzles revealed
to us that there are several specific sub-types that involve very
similar solution principles. This was also highlighted in the set
of Italian rebus puzzles reported by Salvi et al. (2015), in which
they identified 20 categories for the subset of rebus problems.
On inspection of the UK English rebus puzzles, we categorized
the puzzles into substantially fewer categories based on an
observation of the specific solution principles that underpin these
rebus items. We categorized the 84 rebus puzzles that we wished
to norm into six specific categories relating to their structure and
the types of cues necessary to solve each problem.
METHOD
Participants
The study involved 170 participants in total (125 female)
with an age range of 19 to 70 years (M = 36 years-old,
SD = 12 years). Participants received £3 in exchange for 30min
participation time and were recruited via the survey recruitment
website “Prolific Academic.” Participants completed one rebus
set each. All participants were UK nationals and native English
speakers. This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of the British Psychological Society Code of
Human Research Ethics. The protocol was approved by the
Psychology and Social Work Ethics Committee (Ref: 397) at the
University of Central Lancashire, UK. All subjects gave written
informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Design
A total of 84 rebus puzzles were collated and divided into two
equal sets, with 42 rebus puzzles per set (see Appendix A in
Supplementary Material for the Set A items, Appendix B in
Supplementary Material for the Set B items and Appendix C
in Supplementary Material for three practice items that were
used in the study). For each rebus puzzle, a normative solution
rate and mean solution time (in seconds) was obtained. The
maximum available solution time per item was 30 s. The
dependent variables were the solution rate and solution time
for each rebus, an error rate, a measure of confidence in the
accuracy of the response to each rebus, and a measure of
the extent to which each answer was solved via a process of
analysis or insight. The confidence measure and the measure
of analysis/insight phenomenology were each elicited using
continuous sliding scales that participants used to register a
response, resulting in scores ranging from 1 to 100. Thus,
a higher score indicated a more confident response on the
confidence scale and a more “insight-like” response on the
analysis/insight scale. Furthermore, each rebus puzzle was
allocated to one of six categories based on their underpinning
solution principles, with these categories having been developed
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for initial classification purposes (please refer to the Materials
section below for a discussion of the development of these
categories).
Materials
Rebus Puzzles
An initial set of 186 rebus puzzles were selected from copyright-
free sources on the internet. It was ensured that the rebus puzzles
all related to familiar UK English phrases, with the removal of any
specifically American phrases. On inspection of the set of rebus
items, it became clear that there were many common structural
features across the puzzles. Therefore, six puzzle categories were
developed to which each rebus item could be allocated so as to
ensure that different types of rebus were presented in a balanced
manner across item sets (see Appendices A, B in Supplementary
Material). The six rebus categories that were developed are as
follows: (1) a word, picture or number over another word,
picture or number (for an example item see Appendix A in
Supplementary Material, Item 1—“feeling on top of the world”);
(2) a word, picture or number under another word, picture or
number (see Appendix A in Supplementary Material, Item 5—
“try to understand”); (3) a word presented within another word
(see Appendix A in Supplementary Material, Item 6—“foot in
the door”); (4) a play on words with numbers (see Appendix A
in Supplementary Material, item 16—“forty winks”); (5) imagery
(see Appendix A in Supplementary Material, Item 20—“half
hearted”); and (6) spatial (see Appendix A in Supplementary
Material, Item 36—“parallel bars”).
Drawing from the initial set of 186 rebus puzzles, each puzzle
was allocated by two independent judges to one of the six
constructed rebus categories. An inter-rater reliability analysis
was then undertaken utilizing the Kappa statistic (Viera and
Garrett, 2005) to determine the overall consistency in rebus
categorization between the two judges. There was a statistically
significant moderate agreement between the two judges, κ= 0.59
(95% CI = 0.50 to 0.67, p < 0.001). It was also evident from
viewing the rebus puzzles that a number of them might be
deemed to cross two or more categories. To account for this,
and utilizing the Kappa scores, rebus items were selected for the
norming study only when category agreement had been reached
between the two judges. This resulted in a reduced pool of
126 rebus puzzles from the initial pool of 186. From this pool
of 126 puzzles, 3 were selected to serve as practice items (see
Appendix C in Supplementary Material) and 84 puzzles were
randomly selected for norming, with 42 being allocated to Set A
and 42 to Set B (see Table 1 for details). The number of puzzles
that were allocated to each puzzle category within Set A and Set
B were balanced where possible. A number of puzzle categories
were more commonly represented than others, with items falling
into the imagery category being most prevalent, although it
should be noted that this category also involves more varied
items than the other categories. It can also be seen from Table 1
that Categories 1 and 2 had the lowest representation in Sets
A and B, although this relative under-representation may serve
to allay concerns that at an abstract level the solution principle
underpinning puzzles in these two categories is very similar.
TABLE 1 | The number of rebus items per puzzle category for Set A and Set B.
Puzzle category Rebus set
A
Rebus set
B
Total
1. A word, picture or number, over
another word, picture or number
4 3 7
2. A word, picture or number, under
another word, picture or number
1 2 3
3. A word presented within another
word
7 7 14
4. A play on words with numbers 7 7 14
5. Imagery 15 15 30
6. Spatial 8 8 16
Total 42 42 84
A further three rebus puzzles were selected as practice
problems (see Appendix C in Supplementary Material). These
problems served as practice items for both Set A and Set B items.
These practice puzzles were chosen from the pool of problems
for which an agreement had not been reached on a category, and
had answers as follows: “all over again,” “once upon a time” and
“long johns” (Appendix C in SupplementaryMaterial). Problems
for which an agreement had not been reached were selected as
practice items so as not to provide a specific strategic advantage
to the solving of any category of rebus puzzle in the norming
study. Each participant received the same three practice problems
in a fixed order, regardless of the rebus set that they had been
allocated.
Phrase Familiarity Task
In order to solve rebus puzzles, a particular phrase or saying must
be identified from the pictorial, number and word representation
provided. A rebus phrase familiarity task was developed to
test participants’ familiarity with the phrases (or answers)
of each rebus puzzle. Following completion of the full set
of rebus items, participants were presented with the phrases
from the 126 Rebus where a category agreement had been
reached, and a further 26 “pseudo phrases” developed by the
experimenters (see Appendix D in Supplementary Material).
The pseudo phrases were based on existing and well-known
common UK English phrases. For example, “knock on metal” is
a variant of the common phrase “touch wood.” These phrases
therefore had an element of plausibility, whilst not being a
common phrase or saying in UK English. The aim of the
pseudo phrases was to ensure participants’ task engagement
during the phrase familiarity rating task and thereby counteract
any tendency toward purely confirmatory responding. Each
phrase was presented to participants, and they were asked
to respond with “yes” if the phrase was familiar to them,
and “no” if the phrase was not familiar. Participants were
informed that familiarity might stem from the experiment or
from encountering these phrases in everyday life.
Procedure
Each participant completed the experiment individually and
remotely via a desktop PC, laptop computer, or tablet.
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Participants read an information sheet and indicated consent to
participate in the experiment before proceeding. Each participant
completed only one set of rebus puzzles (Set A or Set B). The
experiment was constructed using Qualtrics experimental survey
software and deployed through Prolific Academic, a survey
recruitment platform. Each participant completed the set of rebus
puzzles initially, followed by the phrase familiarity task.
The task instructions were presented on the screen for
participants to read through prior to commencing the
computerized rebus task. Participants were informed that
they would be presented with a combination of words, pictures,
or numbers on the computer screen and that their task was to
identify the common word, phrase or saying represented by these
words, pictures or numbers. Participants were also informed that
they would complete 42 rebus puzzles in the study in addition
to tackling three practice items to begin with. On completion
of the three practice puzzles the answers were provided. This
practice phase helped to ensure that participants were familiar
with the general nature of rebus puzzles as well as with the
response requirements of the study. The three practice items
were identical for Set A and Set B. For each set of rebus puzzles,
the presentation of the items was randomized by the Qualtrics
programme.
All rebus puzzles were presented one at a time in black
and white and were based within a square at the center of
the computer screen covering an area of approximately 10 cm
by 10 cm. The instructions required participants to read the
rebus puzzle carefully, consider their answer, and when they had
generated their final answer to input it in the text box provided.
A maximum of 30 s was provided to view each rebus puzzle and
generate and input an answer to it. The participant was able to see
the timer display with the 30 s time limit. The clock was stopped
when the participant moved onto the following page. This was to
ensure that further thinking time was not taken when inputting
an answer to the problem. If an answer was not provided within
this 30 s time limit, the programme automatically advanced onto
the next page.
Following each rebus puzzle a screen appeared asking
participants to rate their confidence in the accuracy of their
answer on a sliding scale ranging from 1 to 100, where 1 was
labeled as “not at all confident” and 100 was labeled as “very
confident.” Participants moved the cursor to the appropriate
point on the scale to reflect their confidence in their answer for
that problem. A “not-applicable” box was also provided for each
rebus puzzle and participants were asked to select this box to
register a response to the confidence question in all cases where
they had not given an answer to the preceding puzzle.
Following the confidence judgment question, participants
were next asked to provide a rating to indicate their perceived
solution strategy, that is, whether they felt they had solved the
preceding rebus puzzle more by analysis or more by insight (i.e.,
“Did you feel as if the problem was solved more by insight or
more by analysis?”). It was emphasized that insight and analysis
are two ends of a continuum, and therefore participants were
asked to indicate if their answer was more “analytic-like,” or
“insight-like” by responding on a sliding scale. An “insight”
response was described as the following: “Insight means that the
answer suddenly (i.e., unexpectedly) came to your mind while you
were trying to solve the problem, even though you are unable to
articulate how you achieved the solution. This kind of solution
is often associated with surprise exclamations such as ‘A-ha!’.”
An analysis response was described as the following: “Analysis
means that you figured out the answer after you deliberately and
consciously tested out different ideas before you found the right
phrase or saying. In this case for instance, you are able to report
the steps that you used to reach the solution.” The ends of the
response scale in relation to the analysis vs. insight question
were alternated and counterbalanced across participants. A “not-
applicable” box was also provided for participants to select in
those cases where they had not given an answer to the preceding
rebus puzzle. Participants were forced to respond by either
moving the cursor from the mid-way point (50) on the sliding
scale, or by selecting the “not applicable” box before proceeding
to the next page.
On completion of the 42 rebus puzzles, participants completed
a phrase familiarity task. This involved them rating a list of 152
phrases that were presented in a fixed, sequential order. In this
task the participants were presented with the phrases from the
126 rebus puzzles for which a category judgment agreement had
been reached by the raters, along with a further 26 “pseudo” rebus
phrases (see Appendix D in Supplementary Material). Pseudo
phrases were utilized to ensure that a number of phrases were
likely to elicit a “no” response to the familiarity question. For
each phrase, word, or saying, participants were asked to respond
“yes” to indicate that the phrase was familiar to them, and a
“no” to indicate that the phrase was not familiar. At the end of
the experiment participants were debriefed and thanked for their
participation time.
RESULTS
Fundamental Performance Characteristics
of Each Rebus Puzzle
Performance data were collated for the 84 rebus puzzles across
the two sets of items. Each participant completed only one set
of 42 rebus puzzles, with 85 participants completing the 42 Set
A items and another 85 participants completing the 42 Set B
items. For each rebus puzzle we calculated the number of correct
solutions and the number of incorrect solutions that had been
provided by the 85 participants. This allowed us to calculate the
percentage of correct solutions for a particular rebus item, which
we subsequently refer to as the solution rate. Note that a response
was counted as being an “incorrect solution” if an answer to the
rebus puzzle had been provided by a participant that was not the
correct phrase or saying. For example, in response to the rebus
puzzle “try to understand,” incorrect solutions included “try to
stand up” and “try to stand divided.” A “don’t know” response,
or no attempt at an answer, was not counted as an “incorrect
solution,” but was instead designated as being a null response.
In addition, for each correctly solved rebus puzzle we
calculated the mean and standard deviation for its solution time
(out of a maximum of 30 s). The solution time was the time
spent on the rebus puzzle page, including the time to input
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the answer. This was to ensure that any additional time spent
contemplating the answer during the process of typing, was
accounted for in the timing analysis. When 30 s had elapsed, the
programme progressed to the next rebus puzzle. Furthermore,
for each rebus puzzle we calculated a mean confidence rating
for correct solution responses, where ratings could range from
1 (not at all confident) to 100 (very confident). For the insight
vs. analysis rating, we again determined for each correctly solved
rebus item the extent to which it was deemed to have been solved
more by insight or more by analysis. The measurement scale
ranged from 1 (analysis) to 100 (insight).
The various performance measures calculated for each rebus
puzzle are presented in Table 2, with rebus items organized in the
table in descending order of solution rate (i.e., from the easiest
to the most difficult). As shown in Table 2, it is evident that the
84 rebus puzzles vary greatly in terms of their difficulty, with
solution rates ranging from 95.29 to 0%, and with mean solution
times for correct responses ranging from 8.68 to 22.64 s. We
contend that the variability in both solution rates and solution
times for this set of rebus puzzles is of great benefit for the
selection of rebus stimuli for use in future experimental research.
We note, in particular, that there are 50 rebus puzzles with a
solution rate between 20 and 80%, which provides a good number
of items for future use even when those puzzles are discounted
that might be viewed as demonstrating either floor or ceiling
effects.We also note that the performance data inTable 2 provide
good evidence that puzzles belonging to the same category can
differ markedly in their difficulty, as indicated by wide variability
in solution rates. For example, two rebus puzzles from Category
1 (i.e., Item 43—“long overdue”; Item 1—“feeling on top of the
world”) have mean solution rates of 95.29–45.88%, respectively.
This observation again supports the value of these presented
norms for the effective selection and control of rebus stimuli in
future studies.
Table 2 also shows that the mean confidence ratings for
correctly solved rebus puzzles are all above the scale mid-point
of 50, with the exception of just one item (i.e., Item 68—“partly
cloudy”—with a confidence score of 17). These data indicate
that when participants solve a puzzle they generally have above
average confidence in the correctness of the solution, although
such confidence stretches across the full range above the scale
midpoint from 52.80 right up to 100. When it comes to item
selection for future studies using rebus puzzles then the mean
confidence data could be very useful for controlling for problem
characteristics (e.g., enabling mean confidence scores for puzzles
to be equated across different difficulty levels).
In relation to the performance measures for rebus puzzles
that are concerned with self-perceived solution strategies (i.e.,
analysis vs. insight), Table 2 indicates a good degree of variability
in scores across the rebus puzzles, with scores ranging from 1 at
the analysis end of the scale to 76 at the insight end. Interestingly,
however, scores on this measure generally cluster between 35
and 65 (i.e., 15 points either side of the scale midpoint), with
only a few puzzles having scores that extend beyond these lower
and upper bounds. This finding suggests that either insight or
analysis solution strategies may be deployed when solving a
majority of these rebus items, with averaging of scores inevitably
leading to the bunching of scores around the scale midpoint. We
view this observation positively, as it suggests that rebus puzzles
provide an excellent way to explore underpinning problem-
solving processes associated with insight-based solutions vs.
analysis-based solutions.
Solution Strategies and Solution
Correctness
Following on from the aforementioned point, we note that
recent research has revealed that solutions to problems that are
generated by a process of self-reported insight are more likely
to be correct than solutions generated by a process of analysis.
For example, Salvi et al. (2016) demonstrated this finding across
CRA problems, anagrams, rebus puzzles and fragmented line
drawings, with other researchers reporting the same effect with
magic tricks (see Danek et al., 2014b; Hedne et al., 2016). In
explaining this so-called “accuracy effect” in relation to insight
solutions, Salvi et al. (2016; see also Danek and Salvi, 2018)
propose that the effect is most likely to be attributable to
the “all-or-nothing” manner in which insight solutions emerge
into consciousness once non-conscious processing has been
completed. In contrast, solutions that are based on analysis
can be “guesses” that derive from conscious processing that is
prematurely terminated, especially under time constraints. Such
guesses would give rise to more errors of commission (i.e.,
incorrect responses) than errors of omission (i.e., timeouts) when
compared to insight responses (for related evidence see Kounios
et al., 2008).
In order to provide further corroboratory evidence for the
existence of this consistent accuracy effect in relation to insight
solutions, we applied a standard accuracy analysis to the present
dataset to determine whether rebus puzzles that are solved via
insight are more likely to be correct than rebus puzzles solved via
analysis. Of all the solution responses designated as being based
on insight (i.e., falling between 51 and 100 on the analysis/insight
scale), an average of 65% (SD = 27) were correct. In contrast, of
all the solution responses designated as being based on analysis
(i.e., falling between 1 and 49 on the analysis/insight scale), an
average of 54% (SD = 27) were correct. A paired-samples t-test
revealed that insight solutions were indeed significantly more
likely to be correct than analytic solutions, t = 4.76, p < 0.001.
Following Salvi et al. (2016), we also conducted a secondary
analysis of the dataset with a narrower response window than
the full 30 s that was available for solving each rebus puzzle.
The analysis was similar to that just described, except that only
those responses with latencies within a 2–10 s time-window
were included. This approach helps to ensure a similar balance
of insight and analytic responses in the dataset whilst also
eliminating very fast responses made during the first 2 s, given
that participants might inadvertently label these as insight-based
(see Salvi et al., 2016). This revised analysis again revealed
the predicted accuracy effect, with insight responses being
significantly more likely to be correct (M = 79%, SD = 27) than
analytic responses (M = 65%, SD= 36), t = 4.69, p < 0.001.
The previous approach to analyzing the link between
solution strategies and solution correctness revolved around a
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dichotomous measure of solution strategies as being insight-
based (above 51 on the analysis/insight scale) vs. analysis-
based (below 49 on the analysis/insight scale). Conditionalizing
solution correctness on solution strategy has become the
standard approach in the literature for examining the existence
of the accuracy effect. However, on the assumption that there
is a very tight coupling between insight solutions and solution
correctness it is also useful to test for the existence of a
“correctness effect,” whereby correct solutions are more likely to
be solved by insight than are incorrect solutions. This correctness
effect should arise because of the “all-or-nothing” manner in
which correct solutions typically arise via insight in comparison
to the way in which analysis can promote incorrect guesses.
Determining the existence of a correctness effect involves
conditionalizing self-reported solution strategies on the
correctness of the proffered solution. To conduct the requisite
analysis, we made use of participants’ exact ratings on the
1–100 analysis/insight scale, adding a greater degree of precision
to the measure of analysis vs. insight than that which would
arise from simply dichotomizing the scale at its midpoint.
Our resulting analysis simply applied a paired samples t-test
to compare participants’ mean solution strategy scores for
all correct solutions vs. their mean solution strategy scores
for all incorrect solutions. This test revealed that correct
responses resulted in a significantly higher analysis/insight score
(M = 55.74, SD = 22.40) than incorrect responses (M = 47.81,
SD = 18.62), t = 4.64, p < 0.001. The observation that the
mean analysis/insight score for correct response fell above the
scale midpoint indicates a more insight-based solution strategy
for correct solutions. In contrast, the observation that mean
analysis/insight score for incorrect response fell below the scale
midpoint indicates a more analysis-based solution strategy for
incorrect solutions.
In sum, when considered together, the full set of analyses of
the relation between solution strategies and solution correctness
indicates a tight, bidirectional relationship in the form of both an
accuracy effect (insight solutions aremore likely to be correct that
analytic solutions) and a correctness effect (correct solutions are
more likely to be insight-based than incorrect solutions).
Solution Strategies, Solution Correctness,
and Solution Confidence
In considering potential explanations of the accuracy effect
for insight solutions, Danek and Salvi (2018) contemplate the
viability of an account based on the notion that solvers might
use their confidence in accurate responses as a metacognitive
cue for reporting the solution as being based on insight. The
essential idea here is that when accurate, solvers might feel highly
confident about their solution and therefore retrospectively
report having had an insight experience. As Danek and Salvi
(2018) acknowledge, at first glance this account of the accuracy
effect seems to gain support from the observation that confidence
correlates highly with insight ratings (Webb et al., 2016; Danek
and Wiley, 2017). However, Danek and Salvi (2018) counter
that the studies that reveal a correlation between confidence and
insight specifically mention “confidence” in their instructions
to participants, possibly inflating the observed correlation.
Moreover, they note that solvers sometimes also feel confident
about incorrect solutions (Danek and Wiley, 2017), suggesting
that it is unlikely that the accuracy effect is solely based on high
confidence serving as a metacognitive cue for insight ratings.
We agree with Danek and Salvi’s cautionary arguments and
consider that a causal link between confidence judgments and
insight ratings seems unlikely. Given that the present study
elicited confidence ratings from participants for all generated
solution responses, we analyzed the present dataset with a view
to shedding further light on how solution confidence is related
to solution strategy and solution correctness. A 2× 2 Analysis of
Variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine the difference in
confidence ratings according to solution correctness (correct vs.
incorrect) and solution strategy (insight vs. analysis—again based
on dichotomized scores).
The ANOVA revealed that there was no main effect of
solution strategy, with confidence ratings for solutions generated
via insight (M = 59.56, SE = 1.62) not differing significantly
from confidence ratings for solutions generated via analysis
(M = 57.46, SE = 1.41), F(1,136) = 1.47, MSE = 409.40, p
=0.23. There was, however, a significant main effect of solution
correctness, with confidence ratings being significantly higher
for correct solutions (M = 74.35, SE = 1.56) in comparison to
incorrect solutions (M = 42.68, SE = 1.58), F(1,136) = 273.28,
MSE = 502.92, η2p =0.67, p < 0.001. There was no solution
strategy by solution correctness interaction, F < 1, p = 0.42.
These results support the existence of heightened confidence for
correct solutions over incorrect solutions whether or not the
problem was solved via insight, suggesting that there is no unique
and clear-cut link between perceived confidence and insight
phenomenology, thereby supporting the arguments of Danek and
Salvi (2018).
Solution Strategies, Solution Correctness,
and Response Time
A 2× 2 ANOVA was also conducted to determine the difference
in mean solution times as a function of solution correctness
(correct vs. incorrect responses) and solution strategy (insight
vs. analysis). Given that solution-time data are often found
to be positively skewed, thereby undermining the assumptions
required for the pursuit of parametric data analysis, we first
determined the skew in the dataset for each condition according
to each set of rebus puzzles. We observed that two conditions
demonstrated positive skew in their associated solution-time
data, with skew values (i.e., 1.92 and 1.74) above typically
accepted levels (e.g., Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). As a result, a
Log10 transformation was performed on the solution-time data
for all conditions prior to running the ANOVA (see Table 3 for
the natural and Log10 mean solution times for each condition).
For the transformed solution-time data the ANOVA revealed
a significant main effect of solution strategy, with problems
solved via insight being solved significantly faster (M = 1.08, SE
=0.01) than problems solved via analysis (M = 1.17, SD =0.01),
F(1, 136) = 46.04, MSE =0.02, η
2
p =0.25, p < 0.001. This finding
underscores how analysis is often a more laborious process
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TABLE 3 | Mean natural solution times (s) and mean Log10 solution times as a
function of solution strategy (insight vs. analysis) and solution correctness (correct
vs. incorrect).
Puzzles solved by insight Puzzles solved by analysis
Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect
Mean Natural
Solution Times
10.93 (4.12) 15.76 (6.19) 13.32 (4.50) 18.20 (5.79)
Mean Log10
Solution Times
1.01 (0.15) 1.16 (0.18) 1.10 (0.15) 1.23 (0.17)
Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis.
than insight. There was a significant main effect of solution
correctness, with mean solution times being significantly faster
for correct responses (M = 1.06, SE = 0.01) in comparison to
incorrect responses (M= 1.20, SE=0.01), F(1, 136) = 217.47,MSE
=0.01, η2p =0.61, p < 0.001. This observation is unsurprising
given that correct solutions are more likely to arise from a (fast)
insight process than incorrect solutions. There was no solution
strategy by solution correctness interaction, F(1, 136) = 0.79,
MSE= 0.01, p= 0.38.
Phrase Familiarity
In Table 2, we also provide two familiarity counts for the solution
phrase that was associated with each rebus puzzle, with each
familiarity count having a maximum value 85, in line with
the number of participants tackling each set of rebus puzzles.
The importance of providing two familiarity counts for each
particular solution phrase is to draw a distinction between a
familiarity rating given to a solution phrase after the participant
had encountered the corresponding rebus puzzle, compared to
having not encountered the corresponding rebus puzzle. This
distinction is made possible by the fact that each participant rated
the familiarity for each of the 84 solution phrases, whilst only
having attempted to solve 42 of the rebus puzzles relating to
these phrases. The first familiarity count presented in Table 2 is
for the solution phrase from the set in which the corresponding
rebus puzzle had been encountered. The second familiarity count
(provided in square brackets in Table 2) is for the solution phrase
from the set in which the corresponding rebus puzzle had not
been encountered.
An independent samples t-test was conducted to determine if
there was a significant difference between these two familiarity
counts. This analysis revealed that phrase familiarity (M = 78.61,
SD = 5.98) was significantly higher when the rebus puzzle
corresponding to the solution phrase had been encountered
in comparison to when the rebus puzzle corresponding to
the solution phrase had not been encountered (M = 76.41,
SD= 7.43), t = 2.08, p=0.039. This suggests that there might be
a small but reliable bias toward a judgment of familiarity being
given for a solution phrase for which the previous rebus puzzle
had been encountered, even though the “correct” solution phrase
for each rebus has not been provided.
The familiarity data for solution phrases enabled us to
explore a number of potentially interesting associations between
phrase familiarity and the performance measures identified in
Table 2. These associations were explored using the item-based
performance data (i.e., frequency counts and mean scores) for
the 84 rebus puzzles that are depicted in Table 2. In order to
explore patterns of association involving the familiarly data, we
took the two familiarity count measures previously identified and
transformed them into percentage familiarity scores. To reiterate,
the first familiarity score was for the rating of a solution phrase
from the set in which the corresponding rebus puzzle had been
encountered. The second familiarity score was for the rating of
the solution phrase from the set in which the corresponding
rebus puzzle had not been encountered. Having computed the
two percentage familiarity scores for each rebus puzzle we then
correlated these independently with five performance measures
for each rebus item, that is: its solution rate, its error rate (i.e.,
the percentage of incorrect solutions), the mean confidence in
correct solutions, the mean analysis/insight score for correct
solutions and the mean response time (seconds) for correct
solutions.
Pearson correlation coefficients indicated that each familiarity
score was not significantly associated with the solution rate
(r = 0.10 and r = 0.05, respectively, both ps >0.05). The absence
of an association between phrase familiarity and solution success
attests to the challenging nature of many of the rebus puzzles
despite the fact that the underpinning solution phrase was well-
known. For example, the two rebus puzzles with a 0% solution
rate (Item 24—“large overdraft”; Item 9—“partridge in a pear
tree”) still received scores of over 50% for the familiarity of their
solution phrases. In other words, even when there is a good
degree of familiarity with the underpinning solution phrase for
a rebus puzzle, this does not necessarily translate into the ability
to solve the rebus puzzle.
In terms of other observed associations, there was a weak
but nevertheless significant negative correlation between the
first familiarity rating (when the rebus puzzle corresponding to
that particular solution phrase had been encountered) and error
rate (r = −0.24, p =0.03), indicating that as familiarity with
the underpinning solution phrase increased, the percentage of
incorrect solutions decreased. A similar pattern was found for
the second familiarity measure (r = −0.16), but this failed to
reach significance. Neither of the phrase familiarity scores was
significantly associated with participants’ mean confidence in
correct rebus solutions (r = 0.20 and r = 0.14, respectively), with
their mean analysis/insight scores for correct solutions (r = 0.12
and r = 0.16) or with their mean response time for correct
solutions (r = 0.10 and r = 0.12), all ps > 0.05.
Rebus Puzzle Categories
As discussed in the materials section, rebus puzzles were divided
into six categories according to common solution principles
(refer to Table 1 for the distribution of categories across rebus
puzzle Set A and Set B). The measurements presented in Table 2
are reorganized in Table 4 so as to show data collapsed across
the six rebus categories. In other words, these reconfigured data
provide an indication of how each of the dependent variables
differs according to each particular rebus puzzle category.
The data in Table 4 indicate that rebus puzzles in Categories
1, 2, and 4 gave rise to higher mean solution rates than
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TABLE 4 | Normative data for each of the six rebus puzzle categories.
Puzzle category Mean
number of
correct
solutions
Mean
number of
incorrect
solutions
Mean
familiarity
count for
solution phrases
Mean
solution rate
(Percentage)
Mean
solution
time (s)
SD
solution
time (s)
Mean
confidence
rating
Mean
insight
rating
1. A word, picture or number, over another
word, picture or number
57.71 15.42 80.29 67.89 11.65 5.54 76.89 53.92
2. A word, picture or number, under
another word, picture or number
51.67 19.67 79.67 60.78 14.87 5.34 81.72 45.22
3. A word presented within another word 36.87 21.93 79.73 44.48 14.42 5.92 80.40 47.00
4. A play on words with numbers 48.62 23.92 79.38 57.19 12.53 4.96 77.90 53.49
5. Imagery 38.50 30.63 76.76 46.86 11.68 5.05 77.93 48.19
6. Spatial 36.38 28.94 78.40 42.79 12.47 5.51 75.84 53.22
those in Categories 3, 5, and 6, suggesting that the spatial and
imagery related rebus puzzles are generally more challenging
than those related to words, with the exception of the “word
presented within another word” puzzles (Category 3), which
are also more difficult than the other word-related rebus items.
Nevertheless, the item-based data presented in Table 2 reveal
considerable variability in difficulty levels for items within each
of the categories, ensuring that item selection in future studies
can capitalize on such variability in situations where a puzzle-
difficulty manipulation is a desirable feature of an experimental
design.
With respect to mean analysis/insight ratings, the descriptive
data in Table 4 indicate very limited variability in ratings across
the different rebus categories, with mean analysis/insight scores
showing a narrow range from 45.22 to 53.22. A similar picture
of homogeneity emerges for: (1) mean confidence ratings, which
again show considerable similarity across categories, ranging
from 75.84 to 81.72; and (2) mean solution times, which
range from 11.65 to 14.87 s. Such high levels of similarity in
people’s performance measures across rebus categories support
the usefulness of the present norming data to inform item
selection for future studies.
We finally note that the unequal number of rebus puzzles
in each of the rebus categories (including the particularly
low number of puzzles in Categories 1 and 2) precludes the
pursuit of formal, inferential analysis of the possible performance
differences that might arise across rebus categories.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Classic insight problem-solving tasks such as the candle problem
(Duncker, 1945), two-string problem (Maier, 1930) and nine-
dot problem (Maier, 1930) are complex and time-consuming to
solve whilst also yielding potentially ambiguous solutions and
being susceptible to the effects of confounding variables (cf. Ball
et al., 2015). Furthermore, given the popularity of these tasks
in the problem-solving literature and their exposure in research,
the solutions to classic insight problems are often generally well-
known. This has led to the advent of additional pools of insight-
based problems, such as CRAs (e.g., Bowden and Jung-Beeman,
2003b; Wu and Chen, 2017), magic tricks (e.g., Danek et al.,
2014a,b) and rebus puzzles (e.g., MacGregor and Cunningham,
2008, 2009; Salvi et al., 2015).
The use of both CRAs and rebus puzzles is especially
appealing, since in contrast to classic insight problems they are
relatively simpler and yield unambiguous single-word answers
(CRAs) or single phrases (rebus puzzles). They are easy to
administer to participants and straightforward to record answers
for and they are additionally relatively fast for solvers to generate
solutions to. Moreover, multiple problems can be presented
within a single session to maximize the number of observations
per experimental condition, and therefore the reliability of the
data obtained. The problems are also well-suited to study using
fMRI (e.g., Kizilirmak et al., 2016) and EEG (e.g., Li et al., 2016)
due to their simplicity and possibility for presentation within a
compressed visual space. However, the utility of these insight
problems in research is heavily dependent upon the knowledge
of baseline problem difficulties and solution times (i.e., normative
data).
In addition to the many positive features of CRAs and
rebus puzzles that we have identified, we also note that they
appear to share with classic insight problems the same kinds
of underpinning component processes and phenomenological
experiences (Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003a, 2007). For
example, both CRAs and rebus puzzles have the potential to
engender initial misdirection along ineffective solution avenues
or the failure of effective retrieval processes that can culminate
in impasse and a subsequent “Aha!” experience when a route
toward a solution suddenly comes to mind (Salvi et al., 2015).
Therefore, both CRAs and rebus puzzles can be used to address
the degree to which participants differ in their tendency toward
solving particular items via insight or analytic strategies.
The extant literature provides extensive normative data for
CRAs, which have been normed for participant samples in the
USA (Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003b), the UK (Sandkühler
and Bhattacharya, 2008), China (Wu and Chen, 2017), and Italy
(Salvi et al., 2016). To the best of our knowledge, however, there
are very limited normative data for rebus puzzles, with the only
data that are currently available being restricted to a set of 88
Italian rebus puzzles (Salvi et al., 2015). Due to the linguistically
contextualized nature of rebus puzzles, however, it is important
to extend the base of normative data for such problems to other
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languages, including UK English. In setting out to address this
gap in the literature we endeavored to undertake a norming study
with a set of carefully-selected rebus puzzles for which we could
obtain data relating to solution rates, error rates, solution times,
solution confidence, self-reported solution strategies (insight vs.
analysis), and familiarity with the solution phrases.
In Table 2, we provide normative data for each of the 84
rebus puzzles that we examined, which were assessed as two
separate sets of 42 puzzles. Within Table 2, the data are depicted
in descending order of their mean solution rate within the 30 s
time limit available. Also reported in Table 2 are the number
of incorrect solutions, classified as attempts at a response that
gave rise to incorrect words or phrases. Mean solution times (and
standard deviations) are also displayed. Since rebus puzzles may
differentially engender insight vs. analytic solution strategies, we
additionally report data for participants’ self-reported solution
strategies. In Table 4, we provide normative data for rebus
puzzles as a function of the rebus category within which
they fell in terms of the underpinning solution principle. In
Appendices A, B in Supplementary Material, all rebus puzzles
are presented pictorially according to their presented set.
Since solutions to rebus puzzles are contingent on knowledge
of the particular solution phrase underpinning the problem,
we thought it critical to report data on the familiarity of each
phrase that comprised a rebus solution. We observed that
participants were largely familiar with the rebus solution phrases
presented to them. Therefore, we can be confident that the
rebus puzzles that were normed in the present study relate to
well-known UK English phrases or sayings. We distinguished
between two types of familiarity with the solution phrases, and
found that the familiarity for a solution phrase in which the
corresponding rebus puzzle had been attempted was significantly
higher than the familiarity for a solution phrase in the absence
of previously encountering the associated rebus puzzle. It is
interesting to note that this bias existed even though the “correct”
solution phrase for each rebus was not directly provided to the
participants. The mere exposure to the associated rebus puzzle
appeared to increase a subsequent familiarity rating for the
solution phrase. Neither familiarity rating was associated with
solution rate, mean confidence, mean insight or mean response
time. Familiarity ratings were, however, associated with the
percentage of incorrect solutions, in that greater familiarity led to
fewer incorrect solutions, although this association was restricted
to the familiarity rating for solution phrases for which the
corresponding rebus puzzles had been attempted. The absence of
significant associations between phrase familiarity and solution
rate, mean confidence, mean insight and mean response time are
unsurprising, given that we observed generally high familiarity
levels for most of the rebus puzzle solution phrases.
More detailed analyses of the present dataset were also
undertaken, which provide further support for a growing body
of evidence demonstrating that solutions that arise from a self-
reported insight process are more likely to be correct than
solutions that arise via a process of analysis (e.g., Metcalfe,
1986; Salvi et al., 2015; Danek and Salvi, 2018). This particular
advantage for insight responses appears to hold not just for rebus
puzzles, but also for CRA problems, magic tricks and anagrams
(Danek and Salvi, 2018). Not only are insight solutions more
likely to be correct than analytic solutions, they also arise more
rapidly. However, these particular “insight” advantages were not
seen to extend to people’s self-rated confidence in solutions that
were generated via insight (see also Hedne et al., 2016; Salvi et al.,
2016.
We suggest that the rich seam of norming data reported
here for rebus puzzles can be tapped to create different sets
of stimuli that are closely matched on critical variables such
as problem difficulty. This matching can be done either by
hand, or preferably, via the use of stimulus matching software
programs such as “Match” (Van Casteren and Davis, 2007) that
automate the selection of groups of stimuli sets from larger pools
through matching on multiple dimensions. In relation to the
issue of controlling stimulus selection, it is also necessary to
consider the structure of rebus puzzles and the resulting strategy
that might be adopted to solve a particular problem. As noted
in our method section (see also Salvi et al., 2015), given the
structural similarity of some rebus puzzles, care must be taken
to separate these problems to control for, or minimize, order
and carry-over effects from one problem to subsequent ones.
This is important when presenting a set of problems either
within or between experimental blocks. That is, the solution
for one problem with a particular structure (e.g., spatial), may
influence the finding of a solution for a later encountered
problem with a similar structure (e.g., via transfer or priming
effects).
This latter issue is apparent if we consider Item 49
(“THODEEPUGHT”; solution: “deep in thought”) and Item
51 (“CHTONGUEEK”; solution: “tongue in cheek”). Here we
see an example of two different problems from Category 3
(i.e., a word within a word), where the rebus is structured
in such a way that the first word is quite literally presented
“within” another word. Our categorization of the problems into
different structural types that were validated through interrater
reliability checks, can be used to help researchers to identify such
overlap in rebus puzzles and thus avoid an issue of presenting
problems underpinned by a similar structure or solution strategy.
It remains unknown to what extent the transfer of problem
structures assists solution rates or solution times for rebus puzzles
from common categories. The present dataset does not permit
an analysis of order effects according to each rebus puzzle
within each category. However, descriptive statistics provided
for each rebus puzzle do demonstrate a broad range of solution
rates and solution times—even for problems within the same
puzzle category—which is suggestive of minimal practice effects.
Drawing on an example of two rebus puzzles from Category 3,
solution rates for these two puzzles varied from 74.12 to 14.12%.
In conclusion, we hope that the materials and normative data
presented here will arm researchers with important apparatus
through which problem solving and creativity can be studied
with UK English speaking participants. Like CRAs and their
conceptual antecedents, RATs, rebus puzzles can be used across
a broad range of domains to study problem solving and creative
thinking, affect, psychopathologies and metacognitive processes.
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